Introduction
A cooperative enterprise is formed by a group of individuals agreeing to act collectively in order to further their private interests. To this end, a special organizational-legal entity -the asociation -is ordinarily formed. The articles of incorporation of the cooperative association constitute the key contract of the organization. It is a long-term contract involving numerous parties and stipulating the range of joint actions to be undertaken by the association, the terms of membership, and the members' rights and obligations. Also, it sets up an apparatus for group decision making during the operating phase. The terms of the incorporation agreement -which serve as the organization's constitution -are selected by the founders with the aim of creating a (second-best) Pareto optimal contract. In particular, uncertainty, bounded rationality, imperfect information structures, and economizing on bargaining cost preclude a complete contract specifying in full detail the list of all actions to be taken by the association and its members and the allocation of the resulting costs and benefits among members in every conceivable state of nature. A group-choice apparatus, consisting of various decision organs and collective-choice rules (CCRs), is provided instead. These, too, are designed with the aim of minimizing expected transaction cost in the operating phase during which decisions are taken within the constitutionally prescribed framework.
As the cooperative is a voluntary organization, its constitution is agreed upon by all members since each member and each subgroup of members, in fact, accept the constitution by the mere act of joining the organization.
Note that the constitutional and operational phases are treated here as two distinct stages. This, obviously, is just a covenient abstraction.
At the operation phase, the newly formed legal entity enters explicit and implicit contracts with other economic agents. Especially important in this respect are the contractual arrangements concluded with the hired managers since these are crucial determinants of the governance structure in the cooperative enterprise. The cooperative association concludes contracts with various other agents as well: workers, input suppliers, lenders, marketing intermediaries, etc. In most cases, these contracts create fixed claims on the cooperative cash flows, while members-patrons serve as residual claimants. These, along with many other informal internal and external contractual arrangements, form the nexus of contracts constituting the cooperative enteprise [Vitaliano (1983) ].
In the following, a contract theoretic approach is employed in explaining the logic of the constitutional selection of CCRs in a cooperative enterprise. In principle, the contractual approach is applicable in the analysis of other constitutional stipulations as well.
Constitutional selection of collective-choice rules'
Many of the major difficulties arising in group-choice situations in the cooperative stem fundamentally from Arrow's impossibility theorem [Sen (1986) ]. In the present context, one is particularly interested in the manner by which the impossibility theorem is manifested in the cooperative's collective-decision processes and its implications for constitutional choice. As is demonstrated in the following analysis, the impossibility theorem main effect is to increase the uncertainty associated with group choice during the operation phase. The higher risks thus generated can be lowered only at the expense of greater bargaining cost. Since the loss in members' expected utility due to greater uncertainty is also a form of transaction cost, the constitutional-choice problem is thereby converted into a 'transaction cost' minimization problem. That is, CCRs are selected and assigned to various collective-choice problem areas with the aim of minimizing total transaction costs.
A second premise of the theory is that, during the constitutional phase, ' The theory of constitutional choice presented in this article draws heavily on Buchanan and Tullock (1962) . A general discussion of the subject, although in a different context, is available in Mueller (1979). members are uncertain as to their socioeconomic position in future choice situations where the term 'position' refers to future individual preferences, resource endowment, occupation, etc.; they are also uncertain as to other members' positions and the political situation that will prevail at that time. Every member is assumed to possess a subjective probability distribution over the set of events consisting of social positions and political outcomes. Ignorance is at its peak when the member regards all possible events as equally likely.* Problems due to imperfect information are recognized in general terms only. The need to set up a group-choice mechanism to deal with the unfolding states of nature is, essentially, due to imperfect information. Otherwise, the present theory ignores informational problems in order to retain simplicity. As imperfect and especially asymmetric information relations are major determinants of the organizational structure, they should also affect constitutional choice. Nevertheless, the proposed theory of the constitutional-selection problem is independent of problems due to imperfect information.
In fact, an analysis of the relationship between information structures and organization at the constitutional level should be carried out using the present formulation.
The principal ideas outlined above will be demonstrated by means of a simple three members' cooperative faced with a two-dimensional, groupchoice problem in which any one of four possible CCRs may be employed. Admittedly, this is a highly simplfied example. It, nevertheless, captures the principal implications of the impossiblity theorem for social-choice processes and, thereby, enables one to demonstrate graphically the essential elements of the constitutional-choice problem. Consider a cooperative association consisting of three members who, at some time during the operation phase, will have to decide on two policy issues: the share of retained patronage refunds3 and the site location of a cooperative processing plant. The preferences of the individual members among the various policy combinations are represented by the indifference curves drawn in fig. 1 . Thus, points A, B, and C represent the policy combinations most favored by members 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and the utility levels associated with the various indifference curves satisfy the relation Ui, > Ui, > Ui, 2.. . (i = 1,2,3). The preference structure depicted in fig. 1 may be explained as follows. As shipment costs are borne by the producers of raw products, members 1 and 3, who happen to be neighbors, prefer essentially the same site location for the new processing plant.
'This assumption is akin to the Rawlsian original position behind the veil of ignorance [Rawls (1973) ]. Note, also, that in the present formulation choice behind the veil of ignorance is a factual statement and not a normative requirement of impartiality. sRetained patronage refunds refer to payments due to members-patrons that are withheld by the cooperative in order to augment the cooperative's equity capital. Member 2, on the other hand, is located farther away from city X. Also, because of 'horizon prblems', say, member 1 is more impatient than member 2 who, in turn, is more impatient than member 3. The members' time preferences are revealed by their attitude toward the share of retained patronage refunds: the more impatient the member, the smaller the share favored by him/her.
The lines AB, AC, and BC connecting the most favored combinations are loci where the indifference curves of member i and member i (i, j = 1,2,3) are tangential to each other, i.e., they are the corresponding contract curves. We shall refer to the triangular shaped area enclosed by the contract curves by the symbol r. Note that, for any policy combination outside r, there is at least one combination in r which is Pareto superior to it and will, therefore, be unanimously preferred by the membership.
As an example, consider points G and H. H is unanimously prefered to G. Note, also, that for each policy combination in r, there is another combination in r which will be chosen over it by majority voting, e.g., a majority consisting of members 2 and 3 will choose point I over H. Furthermore, by the same rule, .I will be selected over I and H over J. Hence, the simple majority voting rule is cyclical on r, and the ultimate social choice is path dependent [Sen (1986) ]. As an illustration, suppose that at the constitutional phase the following CCRs are considered:
M,: Elect one member who will serve as the sole decision maker on all policy issues ('president') M,: Conduct a referendum over pairs of policy alternatives where the winner in each pair is decided by simple majority, and no bargaining and/or coalition formation is permitted ('referendum').
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M,: Use the same procedure as under referendum, but bargaining and coalition formation are allowed ('voting cum bargaining').4
M,: Select a policy combination with which all members concur ('unanimity').
At the constitutional phase, each member is presumed to know the individual preferences associated with every social position, but he/she is uncertain whether he/she will be in the position of member 1, member 2, or member 3. In fact, there may be many more social positions which the member may consider possible, but these will be ignored for the sake of simplicity and brevity. In the same vein, the member is ignorant as to who will be elected president if M, is chosen, or of the policy combination in r that will eventually be decided upon if a referendum (n/r,) is the constitutionally preferred CCR; neither can he/she foretell which coalition, structure will emerge under voting cum bargaining (M3). At most he/she possesses a subjective probability distribution over the universe of all possible combinations of social positions and political solutions (social outcome space) which is not entirely uninformed. Note that, even if all members were completely certain about their exact future social position, a great deal of uncertainty would still remain. This is due to the wide range of possible political solutions, particularly under CCRs which do not require full unanimity. Also, note that, with the exception of unanimity (M4), all political solutions involve potential externality costs in the sense that a subset of the membership makes choices that determine the well-being of all members. To retain simplicity, we assume a state of complete ignorance; i.e., all possible social outcomes (members' positions and political solutions) under the constitutionally selected CCR are viewed by each member as equally likely. This implies that all members have identical compounded preferences over the universe of uncertain social outcomes. Unless all social positions are identical to begin with, removing some of the ignorance introduces diversity into members' compounded preferences since subjective probability distributions over the social outcome space now vary across individuals. Note, also, that the uncertainty still remaining during the constitutional phase after some ignorance with regard to social positions has been removed, tends to narrow down the inherent differences among members. The expected utilities of the risk-averse, completely ignorant member under various constitutional choices wiI1 now be explored. However, before delving into a detailed analysis, the conceptual problem of calculating expected utilities over social positions must be addressed. If the indifference contours in fig. 1 
The political solution under unanimity (M4) is the outcome of a bargaining game and depends again on the solution concept employed. Thus, if one adopts a concept yielding a unique solution, e.g., the Nash-Harsanyi solution 'It can be verified that E is a bargaining point for the coalition structure {1,2}, 13). This is because, at E, any threat by member k of the coalition (1,2} to form the coalition {k, 3) with member 3 ~ which will raise the payoffs of both members k and 3 relative to E -can be countered by the other member of {1,2}, say, member h. The latter's counterthreat is to form a coalition {h,3}, yielding member 3 an even higher payoff without loss to h. A similar argument applies to points D and F as well.
to an n-person, simple bargaining game [Harsanyi (1977, ch. lo) ], then a single policy combination such as point J in fig. 1 is to be considered. In this case, the member's expected utility is Note that the various CCRs entail different expected utilities and bargaining costs. Let C(M,) denote the cost of reaching a decision ('decision cost')6 per member associated with the CCR M,; then one expects C(M,) < C(M,) < C(M,)<C(M,).
Note that C(M,) consists mostly of the negotiation cost but may include other types of costs, such as losses due to miscalculations. C(M,) is the smallest since, under the presidential system assumed here, collective decisions are made by a single person; C(M,) is the greatest since, under unanimity, each individual enjoys a veto power; and C(M,) is greater than C(M,) since M3 involves bargaining while M, does not.7 Unfortunately, the task of providing a rigorous mathematical analysis of the general relationship between the various V(M,) appears rather difficult. Nevertheless, visual inspection of r in fig. 1 suggests that, while the mean values of the political solutions under alternative CCRs are not too dissimilar, large differences exist among the corresponding spreads, however defined. This observation is not accidental, and the following intuitive explanation of the relationship is offered. Let Dk denote the decisive group (the winning coalition) given the CCR M,. When D, is small, a political solution maximizing the well-being of members of D, at the expense of those not in D, is easier to attain. This is clearly so when D, consists of just one member (as in M,) . When D, is large, its members' preferences are more diverse and the solution agreed upon by members of D, is less likely to maximize their preferences at the expense of the nonmembers of D,. Consequently, the disparity between the utility level of member i -when he/she belongs to the decisive group and the utility level of member i when he/she does not belong _ is greater the smaller is the size of the decisive group. In terms of the illustrative example, the disparity is greatest under the presidential system (Ml) and smallest under the unanimity rule (M4), with the voting rules (M2 and M3) occupying an intermediate position. However, the difference in the spreads of political outcomes associated with the two voting rules derives from a completely different source -the wide range of possible 'decision paths' under referendum (M,) is compared to the limited and centrally 6The term is due to Buchanan and Tullock (1962) . 'Buchanan and Tullock (1962) analyze in some detail the relationship between the size of the decisive group (the winning coalition) and the 'decision cost'. They conclude that the two are positively related.
oriented set of possible solutions under voting cum bargaining (M3). The general pattern of variation in the member's utility level under the alternative CCRs reflects the spread of the policy combinations under these rules. Thus, let 'spread' (Mk) denote a measure of the spatial dispersion of the political solutions (x1,x,) in r under the CCR M,; then spread
Given the 'mean preserving spread' argument implied by the above observation, then for sufficiently risk-averse members
, too, rises with k and, as contracts are purported to be economically efficient, the selection of a CCR would strive to maximize V (M,)-C(M,) .
However, the scope for optimization at the constitutional phase is far broader than suggested by the preceding argument since various political issues may be decided by different rules which are selected in accordance with the sensitivity of the member's expected utility to the ultimate decision and the cost of reaching it. This, in fact, happens in bylaws of various cooperative associations and, indeed, in other organizational forms as well. Now, casual empiricism suggests that a special structure may underlie the relationship between the expected utilities and the corresponding decisions costs over the range of group-choice problems and possible CCRs. In particular, the following assignment of CCRs to problem areas is often observed.
Presidential (M,) type CCRs exhibiting maximal spread (but minimal bargaining costs) are usually confined to matters of less importance. Thus, the chief executive officer or the chairperson of the board of directors may be granted full authority to decide on current operational problems. On the other hand, policy issues, such as those considered in the preceding example, are ordinarily decided by a simple majority of the membership or board members (M, and M3) . Simple majority rules entail medium spreads and decision costs. Special majority, or even unanimity (MJ with minimal spread but maximum bargaining costs, may be required for constitutional amendments.
A structure consistent with the above-mentioned revealed constitutional choices is presented in fig. 2 . Note that, for any given problem area, the relationship is characterized by increasing marginal decision cost; and, as group-choice problem areas are in some sense 'more important', both the decision cost and the expected utility associated with any particular CCR assigned to this problem area also increase. However, the significant structural characteristic -and the one necessary in order to account for the observed behavior referred to under 'casual empiricism' -is the shift in the relative values of expected utilities and decision costs perceived by the membership.
As the group-choice problem area becomes more important, members attach increasingly higher values to the riskiness (spread) of group 'A simple numerical example is presented in Zusman (1988, pp. 9697) . However, what if the complete ignorance assumption turns out to be invalid and the founding members are characterized by more informed and, thus, diverse subjective probability distributions over the social outcome space? Under these circumstances, members' preferences concerning CCRs are also diverse, and constitutional choice involves bargaining. The predicted outcome then depends on the preferred solution concept to the corresponding bargaining game. With appropriate adaptations, the game-theoretic approaches adopted by Staatz (1983) and Sexton (1986) may be employed in deriving the assignment of CCRs to social-choice problem areas. In any event, the present analysis suggests that the uncertainty regarding future social positions and political outcomes characterizing the constitutional phase is conducive to universalistic attitudes on the part of members and to a constitutional preference for CCRs yielding less disperse social outcomes.
Concluding remarks
The conceptual approach employed in the preceding analysis can be extended to other constitutional choice problems. Thus, membership policy is determined by trading off gains due to membership size against the costs of members' diversity. The former is mostly due to the wider sharing of fixed cost and economies of scale in cooperative operations [Buchanan (1965) ]; the latter refers to the decision cost and loss in expected utility discussed in the preceding section.
Similarly, the present theory predicts that internal tax and cost-allocation rules involving personal side payments would be, explicitly or implicitly, constitutionally prohibited in cooperative enterprises.
In terms of fig. 1 , this is because personal Bide pay'ments imply a wide dispersion of the members' most preferred policy combinations.
A constitutional constraint on the choice of internal tax and cost allocation rules during the operation phase is thus established. 
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